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The Disability Insurance Program (DI) and the Social Security Insurance Program (SSI) are the
primary cash transfer programs for the disabled. We compare the potential outcomes of using financial
inducements as a means to increase the work incentives to those who are on DI, and earnings
replacement program, or SSI, a means-tested transfer program not tied to previous work experience.
Our assessment of the existing research on work incentives in programs for the nondisabled leads us to
urge caution in relying on simple financial inducements as means of work-incentive reform without
further, concrete evidence of their effectiveness.The Effectiveness of Financial Work Incentives in DI and SSI:
Lessons from Other Transfer Programs
1. INTRODUCTION
The major programs for the disabled in the United States, the Social Security Disability
Insurance (DI) program and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, are each intended to
provide income support to individuals who have a disability that prevents them from engaging fully in
productive labor force activity. As originally enacted, both programs based eligibility not only on
evidence of a disabling condition but also on low earnings. Recent experience has shown that the
disabled are capable of at least some productive labor force activity and, as such, that basing eligibility
on low earnings may provide work disincentives to existing recipients or even discourage some of the
genuinely disabled from applying for benefits in the first place. This development has led to changes in
the rules governing earnings receipt in both programs designed to encourage work. Additional
programmatic changes have been proposed that are designed to increase work incentives even more.
In this paper we assess the implications of existing research on work incentives in programs for
the nondisabled for the likely effectiveness of the current and proposed work-incentive provisions in
disability programs. Although there has been relatively little research on work effects in DI and SSI,
there has been a tremendous amount of research on the work incentives of transfer programs for the
low-income population, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the Food Stamp
program (FSP), and even a small amount of research on the work-incentive effects of Medicaid. The
relevance of this literature comes not so much from its rather large body of empirical evidence on the
responsiveness of the low-income population to work-incentive provisions—since the responsiveness of
the disabled may be quite different—as from the lessons that have been learned about the way in which
work-incentive provisions operate and what their effects, both intended and unintended, might be. We2
      The rules described in this section can be found in the 1994 Green Book (U.S. House of
1
Representatives 1994).
shall argue that there are a number of important insights from this research literature that have
implications for existing work incentives and proposed work incentive reforms in DI and SSI.
In the next section of the paper, we discuss the major transfer programs for the low-income
population in the United States, what the work-incentive effects of these programs are generally
presumed to be, and what the empirical evidence suggests on the effects of current work-incentive rules
and of past and proposed changes in those rules. In the third section, we provide a parallel discussion of
DI and SSI, and draw lessons for those programs from the literature on nondisability programs. We
discuss the probable effects of both existing and proposed work-incentive provisions. In the final
section of the paper, we draw policy conclusions.
2. TRANSFER PROGRAMS FOR THE NONDISABLED
In our discussion of nondisability transfer programs, we will focus on income-conditioned
programs for the nonaged, and therefore exclude both Social Security and unemployment insurance
from our survey. Instead we concentrate on the AFDC program, the FSP, and Medicaid.
2.1 Description of Program Rules
The AFDC program currently provides cash benefits to families with dependent children,
where a “dependent” child is defined as a child living in a family with only one parent or with an
unemployed parent.  Most AFDC families are headed by women with no adult male present, although
1
the unemployment provision permits some families to receive benefits where both parents are present.
In families where income and asset conditions for eligibility are met, an adult's earnings, if any, are
taken into account in calculating the amount of the benefit, which also varies by family size. First,3
      The $30 flat deduction is eliminated after 12 months of earnings. Both the 12 months of a $30
2
deduction and the 4 months of the one-third deduction can be reestablished after a period of a year,
provided that the recipient has gone off AFDC and come back on in the interim. Also, some states use a
payment method called “fill-the-gap,” which permits a disregard of earnings entirely up to a certain
maximum, after which the tax rates noted in the text are applied.
      Unlike the AFDC program, the FSP has two maximums, one on gross income and one on net
3
income (i.e., income after deductions). A family loses eligibility if either maximum is exceeded.
earnings that cover work-related expenses are allowed, up to a certain maximum, without any reduction
in benefits, as are earnings that cover child care expenses, up to a maximum. In addition, for the first 4
months of earnings after joining the program, a deduction from income of one-third of earnings above
work-related expenses plus $30 is allowed. The marginal tax rate (MTR) on earnings is thus 67 percent
for earnings beyond deductions. The one-third disregard is eliminated after 4 months of earnings,
leading to a 100 percent MTR on earnings above deductions.  In addition to these provisions, the AFDC
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program imposes a maximum on the gross income a family can receive from all sources, earned and
unearned; if income exceeds these amounts, eligibility ends. An increase in earnings which pushes
family income above these maximums thus results in an MTR exceeding 100 percent.
The AFDC program provides extended, or “transitional,” child care benefits to families who
have been made ineligible for benefits because of increased earnings. Child care subsidies are provided
for up to 12 months following the date of exit from the rolls. These provisions can be thought of as
lowering the effective MTR on earnings.
The Food Stamp program provides food coupons to all families, with or without children and
regardless of marital status, who have income and assets below defined amounts. In computing benefits
for families with earnings, a standard deduction is allowed as well as a deduction of 20 percent of
earnings and deductions for child care and shelter expenses up to certain maximums. Earnings above
these deductible amounts reduce benefits by 30 cents per dollar, leading to a 30 percent MTR.
However, as in the AFDC program, families are made ineligible if income rises above certain limits.
34
      Also note that the AFDC benefit is included in countable income for those FSP recipients who are
4
also on AFDC. This inclusion tends to lower the cumulative MTR below what it would otherwise be
for those who are on both programs, since an increase in earnings generally reduces the AFDC benefit,
which therefore increases the FSP benefit. In simple cases, the cancellation is complete: a $1 increase
in earnings lowers the AFDC benefit by $1, so countable income in the FSP is unchanged and hence the
FSP benefit is unchanged.
This leads to a 100 percent MTR at the point at which earnings push a family above one of the
maximums.
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Historically, the Medicaid program has provided subsidized or free medical care mainly to
families receiving AFDC benefits (or SSI benefits). The types and amount of medical care for which an
AFDC family is eligible are independent of its income or benefit amount, and thus the tax rate on
Medicaid benefits is implicitly zero as long as the family is on the AFDC rolls. Until recently,
eligibility for Medicaid was lost in its entirety when a family left AFDC, generating an MTR of over
100 percent on increased earnings at that point. However, Medicaid eligibility is currently not as
closely tied to AFDC receipt as it once was. Many states have a Medically Needy program, for
example, which provides Medicaid benefits to families who are below somewhat higher income and
assets limits than those for AFDC or who experience heavy medical expenses that push them below
those limits. In addition, recent federal legislation has extended Medicaid eligibility to some children
and pregnant women in families who are not on AFDC but whose income is below 133 percent of the
federal poverty line. Finally, transitional Medicaid benefits are available to families who leave the
AFDC rolls because of increased earnings for up to 12 months following exit from the rolls. These
provisions, taken together, can once again be thought of as effectively lowering the MTR faced by
women leaving AFDC.
Cumulative marginal tax rates for families receiving multiple programs can be quite high
(Keane and Moffitt 1991; Giannarelli and Steuerle 1994). In many states, recipients who work part-
time at the minimum wage rate have lower disposable income than they would have if they were not to5
      We have not discussed the MTR arising from participation in public and subsidized housing
5
programs because there has been too little research on their effects. Keane and Moffitt (1991) provide
estimates of these MTRs.
work at all, implying an average tax rate of over 100 percent. Average tax rates between no work and
full-time work at the minimum wage are between 70 and 80 percent nationwide and exceed 100 percent
in some states.  Aside from the Medicaid notch, which can cause high tax rates alone, separate notches
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are created for AFDC and the FSP. In addition, payroll and income taxes generally raise the cumulative
tax rate, since they are only partially (that is, not fully) deductible in the programs.
In the 1980s and 1990s, most of the policy interest in these programs has centered on
employment and training programs for welfare recipients instead of on financial inducements to work
(the major current program of this type is the JOBS program in AFDC). Such programs can be
mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory work programs necessarily increase work effort among those
recipients whose participation is required, obviously, but voluntary work and training programs provide
work incentives through the prospect of increased future earnings or employability. If future earnings
and employability are increased by participation in such a program, the effective MTR (taking into
account future earnings) is lowered even if the current, nominal MTR is 100 percent.
Our paper is mainly concerned with the effectiveness of financial incentives rather than with
the efficacy of work, employment, and training programs. However, we will discuss the policy merits
of both in our final section.
2.2 Expected Effects of Work-Incentive Provisions
The framework within which work incentives of welfare program tax rates are generally
analyzed is the conventional labor-leisure model. That model uses the assumption of utility
maximization to justify the common-sense presumption that individuals trade off the amount of take-
home income they would have for different levels of hours of work with the desire for and difficulty6
      Another possible response can occur if initially there are individuals along segment AC who are
6
eligible for benefits but do not receive them either because of a stigma associated with AFDC receipt or
because the “hassle” and other costs of applying for and receiving benefits outweigh the benefits of the
potential payment. A reduction in t, which increases potential payments, may induce some of these
women to go onto welfare after all, with an associated reduction in work effort.
It should be noted that the welfare program caseload unambiguously rises. Providing work
incentives by lowering the tax rate increases the caseload.
involved in that work. As an empirical matter, the model implies that the choice of how much to work
is partially based upon how much take-home income is gained by working various amounts—or by how
much is gained by working less, in the case of some transfer programs.
The model is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the budget constraints for welfare programs
with different tax rates. In Figure 1, segment ACDE, with slope equal to the hourly wage rate, applies
to individuals off welfare. Segment BC applies to women on welfare if the tax rate is 100 percent.
Segment BD applies to women on welfare if the tax rate takes on a value t, which is less than 1. The
theory implies that an individual will work less on welfare than off welfare, whether segment BC or
BD applies.
A major focus of attention in the research literature has been the effects of a reduction in the
tax rate on work effort. Perhaps surprisingly, the research literature does not yield a clear verdict on
whether work effort would go up or down as a result. The arrows in the figure illustrate the types of
responses that might occur from a shift from segment BC to BD. For individuals initially on welfare
and not working (that is, initially at point B), the reduction in the tax rate may encourage the type of
movement shown by arrow 1, reflecting an increase in work effort. Unfortunately, some individuals
who were initially ineligible for welfare and were hence initially off the welfare rolls are made eligible
by the reduction in t; some of these women will go onto welfare and reduce their work effort, as
illustrated by arrow 2 in the figure. In addition, some individuals who are ineligible for benefits even at
the new, lower tax rate may take advantage of the financial inducement to combine welfare and work
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      In this discussion we have—to a degree—shifted to a model of exit and entry, unlike the static
7
model of our diagrams. In truth, there are continual flows onto and off of the rolls, even in the presence
of “fixed” budget constraints, in response both to unforeseen and controllable events (layoffs, health
events, etc.) and to conscious decision and purposeful behavior (e.g., leaving the rolls to take a job
offer).  Purposeful behavior that takes relative income and work incentives into account will result in a
long-run equilibrium similar to that portrayed in the static model, as higher fractions of individuals end
up in portions of the constraint with higher income.
The net effect of the reduction in the tax rate is thus ambiguous in direction, and could be
positive or negative on the overall level of work effort. It is even theoretically possible that 100 percent
tax rates result in the greatest amount of overall work effort in the low-income, eligible population.
This would occur if any reduction in t below this level induced large numbers of individuals to come
onto the rolls and work less than they had been working off the rolls.
The possibility that large numbers of eligibles would rush onto the welfare rolls if the tax rate
were lowered seems implausible in many circumstances. However, the same end result would occur
even if entry rates onto welfare were completely unaffected by the level of the tax rate, but if exit rates
were affected. Even if individuals joined the rolls only because of unforeseen job losses, adverse health
events, or other unplanned changes in household structure (for example, divorce), the likelihood that
they would leave the rolls after going on would be reduced by a low tax rate. There may be many
welfare recipients who would, for example, ordinarily leave the rolls to take a full-time low-wage job if
the tax rate were 100 percent, but who would choose to stay on the rolls and work part-time if the tax
rate were lower. After some period of time, some number of recipients would end up working on the
rolls who would otherwise have been off the rolls working longer hours.
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Whether this possibility has any relevance to actual situations will be discussed momentarily in
the context of a discussion of the available empirical evidence. However, even if it is relevant to actual
situations, it does not imply that reductions in tax rates below 100 percent are undesirable, only that
they must be justified on some grounds other than as a means to increase average work effort. For
example, it may be desirable per se to have welfare recipients work, even if this can be achieved only9
      Although very little is known of underreporting among AFDC recipients, based on anecdotal
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evidence, many suspect it to be common. One study of 50 AFDC families in Chicago found that all 50
were receiving some form of unreported income (Edin 1991). The general presumption in the literature
is that the frequency and magnitude of underreporting of income is positively associated with the level
of the tax rate.
by broadening the recipient population to include individuals who would otherwise have been off the
rolls (they are likely to be low-wage individuals as well, of course). Alternatively, it may be desirable
to avoid a division of the low-income eligible population into those who are on welfare and not working
and those who are off welfare and working long hours. A reduction in the tax rate which increases the
work effort of the former group but reduces it for the latter group may serve to equalize the distribution
of earnings and income in the eligible population and lessen polarization. In addition, it may be
desirable to have a program that offers income supplements to individuals who work part-time but are
still poor (assuming that such work is covered by a low t) simply because they are considered to be
deserving of assistance, even if by doing so some recipients may reduce work effort from full-time to
part-time. Finally, low tax rates may be desirable to avoid underreporting of income and fraudulent
work while receiving benefits.
8
Another possibility is that work while on the welfare rolls provides a welfare recipient with
work experience and increased skills, thereby raising earnings ability (that is, the wage rate) and
encouraging exit from the rolls in the future. Whether the types of jobs that welfare recipients are likely
to have while on the rolls would provide a stepping-stone to permanent self-sufficiency in the job
market, or whether such jobs are likely to be high-turnover, dead-end jobs that lead nowhere but back
onto the rolls, is an empirical question. However, if this is the goal of the reduction in the marginal tax
rate, it could be fairly asked whether job training programs are not a superior method of increasing
skills.
Finally, the literature in this area has shown that the same work incentive difficulties that arise
with tax-rate reductions also arise when transitional child care and Medicaid benefits are provided10
(Moffitt and Wolfe 1990). In this case, the provision of such benefits provides an incentive for
individuals who leave the rolls to work less than they would have otherwise during the transition period,
while also providing an incentive to those who are on the borderline between applying or not applying
for benefits in the first place to apply in circumstances where they would not have otherwise because
they know that transitional benefits will be available should they go off the rolls. Consequently,
transitional child care and Medicaid benefits may have the undesirable effect of actually increasing the
caseload and reducing average levels of work effort.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence on the effects of welfare program tax rates on work effort comes from three
sources: (1) econometric estimates of tax-rate effects from cross-sectional survey data; (2) estimates
from controlled experiments testing a negative income tax; and (3) historical evidence from actual
changes in the tax rate in recent decades in particular programs such as AFDC. We will not discuss any
evidence on the effect of transitional child care and Medicaid benefits on work effort and the caseload,
since those provisions have not been studied. Nor will we review the evidence on the earnings and
caseload impacts of welfare employment and training programs, since our review is focused on
financial inducements to work.
Cross-sectional econometric estimates of the effect of welfare programs on work effort
generally relate differences in hours of work to differences in benefit levels and MTRs among welfare-
eligible individuals living in different states with different benefit schedules (Danziger, Plotnick, and
Haveman 1981; Moffitt 1992). Most of these studies have examined the effect of welfare on the level
of work effort per se, and have found that welfare programs provide some disincentive to work and
therefore that work effort would be higher in the absence of the programs. However, only a minority of
the studies examined the issue of whether the net effects of a change in the MTR on work effort would
be positive or negative; most studies estimated instead the “marginal” effects of changing the MTR11
      Technically, these studies estimated the substitution and income elasticities assuming that the
9
budget constraint segment upon which individuals were located did not change.
      That is, income elasticities are estimated to be negative and substitution elasticities are positive.
10
conditional on program participation—that is, the effect of a change in the MTR on hours of work for
those on AFDC before and after the change.  On this issue, the research studies indicated that there
9
were non-zero, but moderately sized, responses to benefit levels and MTRs—both higher benefits and
higher MTRs are correlated with less work effort, assuming the individual is on AFDC before and after
the change.  Thus, arrow 1 in Figure 1 was found to be significantly positive: when faced with a lower
10
MTR, many AFDC recipients enter the workforce and work.
Three studies reviewed by Danziger, Plotnick, and Haveman did estimate net effects of changes
in MTRs, however. Those three (Masters and Garfinkel 1977; Levy 1979; Barr and Hall 1981) found
either no net effect of tax rates on work or a “perverse” effect—higher tax rates increase work levels.
The explanation given for these findings was that the positive effects on the work effort of initial
recipients are canceled out by the negative effects from new entrants and from a decline in the exit rate.
Thus these studies suggest that the theoretical possibility discussed above of significant offsetting
effects to the work incentives of lower tax rates is, unfortunately, supported by the evidence.
There have been only a few additional studies of the AFDC program since the Danziger,
Plotnick, and Haveman review, but those that have provided further evidence in support of weak effects
of the changes in the MTR. Moffitt (1983) applied more advanced econometric methods to the problem
but found, again, essentially no net work effort effect of changes in the tax rate. Keane and Moffitt
(1991) incorporated the housing program into a model of AFDC and Food Stamps, and found that
changes in cumulative MTRs had very little net effect on work effort. Hoynes (1993), in the first work-12
      Another approach taken to estimating net effects of tax rates has been to simulate those effects
11
from a microsimulation model, applying estimated elasticities from the econometric literature to
representative household data bases (Moffitt 1992; Fortin, Truchon, and Beausejour 1993). These
studies confirm that lowering tax rates in welfare programs may reduce work effort, depending upon
the size of the estimated responses but also the relative numbers of eligible individuals in different
portions of the income distribution.
      A recent study by Yelowitz (1994) did examine the effects of the Medicaid notch, however, and
12
found that it had negative effects on the probability of working.
incentive study of the AFDC-UP program, found essentially zero net effects on the work effort of
husbands and wives of reductions in the MTR on earnings.
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Only a few studies have been conducted on other programs. Fraker and Moffitt (1988)
estimated the effects of the Food Stamp program on the work effort of female heads and found, again,
that the net effect of MTR reductions was zero. Estimates of the effect of the Medicaid program on
work effort have been conducted by Blank (1989), Moffitt and Wolfe (1992), and Winkler (1991). Two
of the studies showed rather weak effects of the Medicaid program on work effort while the third
showed quite strong effects. However, none of these studies specifically examined the effect of the
notch imposed by Medicaid.
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The negative income tax (NIT) experiments conducted in the 1970s provided additional
evidence on the responsiveness of welfare recipients to welfare programs (Burtless 1987; Kehrer and
Moffitt 1981; SRI International 1983). In these experiments, a sample of the low-income population in
several cities was selected and its members were randomly assigned either to an experimental group,
which received a welfare program with varying benefit levels and MTRs, or to a control group, which
was eligible only for the existing welfare system. Estimates were obtained by comparing work effort
levels of the control group to those of the different experimental groups with varying benefit levels and
MTRs. The results of the experiments showed that an NIT with higher benefit levels than those in the
existing AFDC system would reduce work effort of female heads, and that an NIT of any type would
reduce the work effort of men and women for whom no existing program was available. The13
      See Kehrer and Moffitt (1981) for details.
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      The experiments also excluded eligible nonrecipients, whose responses would also affect the net
14
effect in real-world welfare programs.
experiments also provided estimates of the responsiveness of welfare recipients to changes in benefit
levels and MTRs, assuming the individual to be on AFDC before and after the change. The estimates
were found to be non-zero, but slightly lower in magnitude than those estimates based on cross-
sectional survey data.  Unfortunately, the experiments provided little evidence on the net effect of
13
changes in welfare program tax rates. In part, this is because the experiments were not designed to
estimate net effects of tax-rate changes because they excluded families with income very much above
the break-even level, and hence could not capture effects of tax-rate changes that might arise from that
group.
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Finally, some studies have been conducted on the effects of two historical changes in the AFDC
tax rate—its reduction from 100 percent to 67 percent in 1969, as a result of the 1967 Social Security
Act (SSA) amendments, and its increase from 67 percent to 100 percent in 1981 as a result of the 1981
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA). Early studies of the 1967 SSA amendments examined
the changes in employment and earnings among recipients remaining on the AFDC rolls, and hence
once again excluded responses from entry and exit and did not estimate net effects (Appel 1972; Bell
and Bushe 1975; Smith 1974). Those studies suggested that work effort initially went up among women
on the AFDC rolls. However, aggregate data on the AFDC participation rates and work-effort levels of
female heads in the United States in the early 1970s, just following the reduction in the tax rate, showed
increases in participation rates and decreases in the work effort (Moffitt 1992). Thus, net effects
appeared to be zero, and therefore there was no evidence of increased work following the legislation.
The 1981 OBRA legislation was evaluated more formally. The best study was conducted by the
Research Triangle Institute (1983), which examined the exit rates and work-effort levels of women14
initially on the AFDC rolls at the time of the legislation, some of whom were made ineligible by the
increase in the MTR. The results of the evaluation indicated that the increase in the tax rate to 100
percent had no discernible work-discouraging effects on those who were initially on the rolls and
working, in the sense that there was no evidence of their having reduced work effort to zero to retain
eligibility for benefits. However, the study did find that the exit rate from AFDC increased, consistent
with the expected effects discussed previously. Unfortunately, the study failed to gather information on
the work effort levels of those who left the rolls following the change, or on the work effort levels of
those who failed to apply for benefits following the tax-rate increase, and hence the total effect (that is,
the net effect) of the change could not be ascertained. However, once again, subsequent time-series
evidence on work effort levels of female heads showed very little effect of the legislation subsequent to
the change (Moffitt 1986).
In summary, the empirical evidence in the welfare program literature reveals a consistent
pattern of inelastic (that is, weak) responsiveness of work effort to changes in marginal tax rates.
Despite MTRs of or in excess of 100 percent, there is very little evidence that reductions in those
MTRs would induce any statistically detectable increase in overall hours of work or employment
among the low-income population. It is partly a result of this realization by policy analysts and
policymakers that efforts in the 1980s to change work patterns among AFDC recipients shifted so
strongly toward employment and training programs and away from the use of financial incentives.15
      Other public programs that provide cash benefits for the disabled include several veterans’
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compensation programs, workers’ compensation, and (optional) state-provided temporary disability
benefits. The discussion in this paper will be limited to the DI and SSI programs.
3. TRANSFER PROGRAMS FOR THE DISABLED
3.1 Description of Program Rules
The primary cash transfer programs for the disabled consist of the Social Security Disability
Income (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.  The DI program is a major part of
15
the Social Security program of Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI). It was added in
1957 and is designed to provide partial earnings replacement to all workers under 65 who sustain
severe, long-term (typically career-ending) disabilities. All workers covered under Social Security
(about 95 percent of the United States workforce) are also covered for DI benefits; financing for the
program comes out of employer- and employee-paid FICA taxes. In 1993, the DI program provided
benefits for about 5 million disabled, nonaged individuals for a total cost of $34.5 billion (U.S. House
of Representatives 1994).
The SSI program provides benefits to the aged, blind, and disabled. The goal of SSI is to
provide an income floor and receipt is not tied to previous work experience. The program, enacted in
1972 and implemented in 1974, is funded from general revenues and benefits are standardized across
the states. However, most states supplement the federal SSI benefits through state SSI programs. On
average, 4 million disabled workers and their dependents received federal SSI benefits per month in
1993, for a total annual cost of about $35 billion. The disabled represent about 75 percent of the total
SSI caseload. DI recipients with low benefits can use SSI to supplement their income. About 16 percent
of DI recipients also receive SSI (Social Security Administration 1994).
Both programs define disability as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in16
      The SGA is not indexed for price changes and has been increased nine times in the program's 35
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years. The SGA started in 1957 at $100, and was set at $300 from 1980–1990 before the latest increase
up to $500. 
      To qualify for DI, applicants must have worked 20 of the last 40 quarters preceding the quarter of
17
application, or half the quarters since age 21. The work history required for DI is virtually the same as
that required for social security retirement benefits. 
      The benefit can be as large as 150 percent of PIA for disabled workers with families.
18
      The earnings figures refer to the worker's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) in social
19
security employment. The DI benefit, equal to the worker's PIA, is a function of the AIME. Benefits
are adjusted for changes in the cost of living. The PIA and AIME are calculated in roughly the same
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months” (Social Security Administration 1992). Therefore, the medical definition of disability is not
sufficient for benefit receipt. Instead, initial and continuing eligibility for both programs is tied to the
ability to work. Substantial gainful activity (SGA) is defined as a threshold level of earnings, which is
currently set at $500 per month.
16
Social Security Disability Income Program (DI). Eligibility for DI requires meeting the
definition of disability (given above), having sufficient work history in social security–covered jobs,
and not working or working and earning less than the SGA threshold.  When determining if earnings
17
exceed SGA (both for initial as well as continuing eligibility), deductions are allowed for
impairment-related work expenses (IRWE). The DI benefit is equal to 100 percent of the worker's
primary insurance amount (PIA), which is a function of the individual's earnings history in social
security–covered employment.  This benefit can be significant, and is typically equal to the full value
18
of the worker's potential social security retirement benefit. In 1993, DI benefits for disabled workers
averaged $642 per month. The PIA calculation is based on a progressive structure under which
high-wage workers obtain lower earnings replacement rates than lower-wage workers. The replacement
rate in 1994 ranges from 78 percent for workers with low average monthly earnings ($500) to 29
percent among workers with high monthly earnings ($4500) (U.S. House of Representatives 1994).
1917
way as they are for social security retirement benefits. 
      If a person has never achieved SGA, the EPE is extended indefinitely. However, benefits will be
20
discontinued the first time that SGA is achieved.
Medicare benefits are available after 24 months of DI benefit receipt. Once the individual
enters the EPE, Medicare benefits are available for the next 39 months. Thus Medicare is provided for
3 months past the end of EPE. Once a worker reaches age 65, the DI case is automatically transferred
to the social security retirement system. 
To examine the work-incentive provisions in the DI program, we must examine the five
possible phases of DI receipt that working recipients can experience. First, there is a 5-month waiting
period after disability begins before receiving benefits (although there is no waiting period if the
individual returns to the rolls within 5 years of leaving). Second, a trial work period (TWP) allows for 9
months of work over a 60-month period. A month is counted as a trial month if the individual earns
over $200 in the month. Third, individuals who accumulate 9 months of work have their case reviewed;
if the work in which they have been engaged is “SGA” (generally meaning that it reflects an ability to
earn more than the SGA monthly threshold), benefits are extended for a 3-month grace period and then
stop. During the TWP, benefits are provided in full regardless of the level of earned or unearned
income and are intended to let recipients test their ability to work without danger of losing benefits.
Fourth, recipients who have reached this point enter the extended period of eligibility (EPE), which
lasts 36 months. After the 3-month grace period, benefits are provided in full if earnings (net of allowed
deductions) are less than SGA, but are reduced to zero if earnings are over SGA. After the EPE is
exhausted, the individual is dropped from the rolls if he has achieved SGA (or must file a new
application if he is still disabled).
20
The marginal tax rates (MTRs) on earnings in the DI program are generally much lower than
those found in the programs for the nondisabled. During the TWP, for example, the MTR is zero.
Further, the MTR is also zero during the EPE if earnings are below SGA. However, by eliminating
benefits for workers over SGA, an MTR of over 100 percent is created on earnings that push the18
      All figures refer to 1994 levels.
21
individual just over SGA. This creates a “notch” that resembles the MTR of over 100 percent created
by the loss of Medicaid benefits in the nondisabled programs previously discussed. Hoynes and Moffitt
(1994) find that DI recipients who enter the labor force on a part-time basis experience average tax
rates that range from 60 to 91, depending on their earnings capacity. Those entering at full-time levels
experience average tax rates of about 40 percent.
Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI). While the DI program is an earnings-
replacement program, the SSI program is a means-tested transfer program that is not tied to previous
work experience. Consequently, the eligibility and benefit formulas are similar to those in the means-
tested programs for the nondisabled. In order to be eligible for SSI, the individual must meet the
definition of disability, have income and assets below the eligibility requirements, and not work or
work and earn less than the SGA threshold. The income test, asset test, and benefit level vary by living
arrangement. The asset limit is $2000 for single persons and $3000 for couples, while the income test
requires that countable income—which includes both earned and unearned income—not exceed $446
for single persons and $669 for couples for 1994. The main deductions used in calculating countable
income include the full deduction of impairment-related work expenses (IRWE), $20 of monthly
income, $65 of earned income, and one-half the remaining earnings. This creates an MTR of 50 percent
for earnings above deductions. Benefits are equal to the program guarantee ($446 for singles persons
and $669 for couples) less countable income. These benefit levels are adjusted annually for changes in
the cost of living. All SSI recipients are also eligible for health benefits through the Medicaid
program.
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Work effort is observed to be quite low in both the DI and SSI programs. In a study of a sample
of new entrants to DI in the early 1980s, only 10 percent of all participants had any work experience
over a 10-year period following initial benefit receipt (Muller 1992). Three percent left the rolls19
because of increased earnings and 5 percent attempted trial work but did not result in SGA termination.
Those who worked were more likely to be younger, white, female, single, with higher education levels,
lower DI benefits, and less severe disabilities. SSI workers have represented about 6 percent of the total
SSI caseload since the mid-1980s (Social Security Administration 1993).
3.2 Expected Effects of Work-Incentive Provisions
The DI and SSI programs are designed to replace (or supplement) earnings for workers who are
unable to engage in “substantial gainful activity.” There is, of course, a potential moral hazard problem
associated with these programs inasmuch as disability is not a purely medical condition but may
respond to economic and other factors. High benefits or lenient application procedures may lure those
who are in poor health, but with employment possibilities, out of the labor market. Furthermore, a high
MTR may lead to low work effort among the recipient population.
To begin, consider how the existence of the DI program affects work effort among the disabled.
First, eligibility requires that during the application and waiting periods, recipients must earn less than
SGA. This will act to lower work effort. The time spent out of the labor force while establishing
eligibility may be quite costly, especially since many recipients are initially denied and since
acceptance may follow only after a lengthy appeals process. Bound (1991) estimates that DI recipients
are out of work for an average of 8.5 months before receiving benefits.
Second, the level of work effort is affected by the TWP. Figure 2 shows the one-period budget
constraint that operates for the TWP as well as the grace period. Without DI, the relevant budget
segment is ADF. During the TWP, benefits are received in full regardless of earnings (MTR equals
zero) thus shifting out the budget constraint by the amount of the benefit, resulting in the DI budget


















      The original DI program did not have the TWP or EPE features. The TWP was introduced in 1960
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and the EPE in 1980.
causing work effort to fall. High benefits may induce some workers to accept DI and reduce labor
supply, and they might possibly even leave the labor force altogether.
Third, a different effect of the DI program on work effort is created during the EPE. The
income opportunities during the EPE are shown by budget segment ABCD in Figure 3. If earnings are
less than SGA, benefits are provided in full. Above H , the break-even level of hours, the benefit is cut BE
off completely and the MTR is over 100 percent. In this case, the worker would have to increase hours
of work to H  to make up for lost DI income. The EPE, like the TWP, provides a negative income 1
effect that reduces work, as illustrated by arrow 1. In addition, the notch provides a strong incentive to
work at levels below SGA. In this situation, shown in arrow 2, some individuals who might otherwise
have had high work effort could be induced by the DI benefits to work at lower work levels to remain
below SGA. Overall, providing benefits to the disabled through the DI program will reduce labor
supply among the disabled.
These effects are not necessarily of greatest policy interest, because they concern the effects of
the DI program relative to having no program at all. Of more interest are the expected effects on work
effort of the provisions of the DI program that are intended to provide work incentives—mainly the
TWP and the EPE—relative to a DI program that did not have such provisions. To examine the effects
of these work incentives—or any proposed changes in existing incentives—we need to consider
changes in work effort among current recipients, as well as any changes in entry and exit rates which
also contribute to changes in the overall level of work effort among the disabled.
First, consider the effects of adding a TWP to a “strict SGA” program in which benefits are
unaffected if work is below SGA but are eliminated entirely for work above SGA.  The effect of the
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      Once again, such exit rates can only be understood if it is realized that a dynamic model involving
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normal flows onto and off of the rolls underlies the static diagrams we have drawn.  Normal exits from
the rolls occur, for example, from job opportunities which arise, even though the budget constraint does
not change in the ordinary sense of the word. Whether an individual takes advantage of such
opportunities will no doubt be based in part on the relative income gain or loss associated with leaving
the rolls vs. staying on. These are the same considerations that underlie the arrows in our static
diagrams, although in a dynamic context.
constraint is ADF, while the budget constraint is ABCD under the “strict SGA” DI program. The
addition of the TWP extends benefits regardless of earnings, extending the DI budget constraint to
ABCE. As intended, this change provides a work incentive for those recipients who were initially at or
a bit below SGA to work more than SGA, as shown by arrow 1. However, by making the program
more generous for those who can and wish to work above SGA, exit rates from the program will fall in
the longer run due to the fact that some recipients who would have moved off the program in order to
work above SGA will stay on.  Thus, although work effort among current participants may increase in
23
the short run, it may fall in the long run because those who would have exited the program will work
less in the long run than they would have otherwise, as illustrated by arrow 2 (income effects induce a
reduction in hours of work). In addition, because benefits can now be received above SGA, entry rates
may increase due to the creation of incentives for eligible nonparticipants to apply for benefits, should
they think that work above SGA is likely for them if they go onto DI. This would also increase the
caseload and result in reduced work effort. Overall, the introduction of the TWP has ambiguous net
effects on the level of work effort of DI recipients and the eligible population, for the increased work
among initial recipients may be outweighed by the likely future reductions in work among those who
delay exit and those who enter.
The effects of the EPE, which was introduced in 1980, are, at least at first inspection, more
clear-cut since the benefit schedule reverts to its strict SGA form of loss of benefits for work above
SGA (aside from the retention of Medicare and other benefits, whose effects are similar to the
TWP—these benefits are provided above SGA). Once a worker is in the EPE, the incentives to work24
      The EPE may also reduce exit rates from DI when averaged over the 36-month period. For
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example, recipients may take jobs with possibly short durations to try them out, knowing that they will
probably return within a few months to collect benefits. While this encourages work effort among those
who would have not worked at all, it discourages work effort among those who would have otherwise
chosen to go off the rolls altogether at a job with greater prospects of stability and longevity.
above and below SGA are the same in each month as they were in the strict SGA program. However,
the main effect of the EPE is in its provision of insurance for 36 months against a fall in earnings. In
the strict SGA program, a recipient might have hesitated to work above SGA because of the danger of
not being able to sustain such high earnings and having to reapply for benefits. This is part of the
intention of the EPE program, and presumably increases work effort during the EPE period.
However, even with the EPE there is the possibility of increased entry after its provision. The
increased generosity created by the EPE may make the DI program more attractive to eligibles who are
on the margin of applying or not applying for benefits, and may tip them in the direction of applying.
Whether this will happen will depend on the extent of information about the DI program, whether
eligibles have reasonably good expectations of whether or not they will attempt to work when on the
program, as well as the costs associated with application. An entry will raise the DI caseload and
reduce work effort, since those who enter will work less, on average, while on the DI program than
they would have if they had stayed off DI. Thus, in principle, the net effect of EPE is ambiguous in
direction, and can only be resolved by empirical research.
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This discussion shows that there is a basic similarity between the TWP and EPE work
provisions of the DI program, on the one hand, and the MTR reductions in nondisability programs,
which are also aimed at increasing work effort, on the other. Both have ambiguous net effects on the
level of work effort of the recipient and eligible populations because, while they have positive work
incentives for some, they also reduce exit rates and possibly increase entry rates, both of which reduce
long-run work effort (and increase the caseload). The similarity in the effects arises because both types25
      Some important dynamic considerations of the DI program have been left out of this discussion.
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For example, even though benefits are not reduced during the TWP, potential benefit cutoffs begin after
9 months of work if the recipient enters EPE. Consequently, taking advantage of the TWP will increase
income at the time but reduce future income prospects, effectively increasing the MTR and reducing
work effort. Similarly, individuals who consistently work above SGA during the EPE will be eventually
be dropped from the system altogether after 36 months, thus losing Medicare benefits as well as the
insurance of DI benefits if wages drop below SGA. This also operates to increase the effective MTR.
Lastly, Medicare benefits will be lost 3 months after the end of the EPE when leaving the DI rolls.
There is anecdotal evidence that losing health benefits may be a larger work disincentive for the
disabled than the prospect of losing cash benefits (National Academy of Social Insurance 1994).
      This discussion highlights that the main difference between SSI and DI is in the treatment of
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earnings. In SSI, SGA is only used when determining initial eligibility and benefits are reduced with
increases in earned income. The notch in the DI budget constraint during the EPE does not exist in SSI.
However, this difference is only a result of recent legislative changes in the SSI program. Provisions
referred to as 1619(a) and 1619(b) started in 1980 and were made permanent in 1986. These provisions
dramatically change the earnings opportunities for disabled workers. Previously, SSI recipients had a
of financial incentives operate by making the program more generous, and therefore more attractive, to
working individuals compared to their prospective situations off the program.
25
  The work incentives of SSI differ considerably from DI, although they are similar to those in
the AFDC or Food Stamp programs, described above. The work incentives of SSI can be discussed by
referring to the welfare budget constraint for the nondisabled in Figure 1, substituting the SSI implicit
tax rate on earnings of 50 percent (t = 0.5 in Figure 1). The 50 percent MTR implies that if earnings are
increased by $1, total income increases by only 50 cents. Benefits are phased out as earnings increase
and reach zero at the break-even level (point D). As above, the static labor supply model implies
unambiguously that the existence of SSI will reduce work effort among the disabled relative to having
no program at all. There is an income effect associated with the guarantee (as with the DI program) but
the 50 percent MTR induces a substitution effect that is not present in the DI program. The income and
substitution effects work in the same direction and hours of work must fall. If the MTR is reduced, the
net effect on work effort is ambiguous in direction, however. As discussed in Section 2.2 for the
nondisability programs, such a reduction lowers work effort because of a delay in exit and an increase
in entry.
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trial work period, and Medicaid and cash benefits were lost when a worker had countable earnings that
exceeded SGA. In that case there is a MTR of 50 percent below SGA, at which point the remaining
benefits (and Medicaid coverage) are lost in entirety. Provision 1619(a) allows SSI (and Medicaid)
benefits to be continued even at earnings exceeding SGA (until sufficiently high earnings moves a
person off the rolls completely). To ease the transition back to work, provision 1619(b) extends
Medicaid coverage when a worker's earnings renders them ineligible for SSI benefits.
      This literature is critically reviewed in Leonard 1986, and the exchanges between Parsons 1984
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and Haveman and Wolfe 1984b and Parsons 1991 and Bound 1991.
The empirical studies of the work disincentive effects of the SSI and workers’ compensation
programs are much less developed. McGarry (1993) considers the effect of potential benefits on
take-up of SSI benefits among the low-income elderly.
      The majority of the literature defines the dependent variable to be labor force participation or not
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(Haveman, de Jong, and Wolfe 1988; Gruber and Kubik 1994; Haveman and Wolfe 1984a; Parsons
1980a, 1980b; Slade 1984). Leonard (1979) specifies the dependent variable as DI participant or not.
Operationally, there is little difference between these approaches. Halpern and Hausman (1986)
consider three states: DI recipient, DI rejected applicant, and non-applicant. Haveman, Wolfe, and
Warlick (1988) consider the DI recipient, social security early retirement, and labor force participant
choices. 
3.3 Empirical Results
The scope of the empirical literature on work incentives of disability income programs is
somewhat limited compared to the literature for the nondisabled. The main body of empirical studies
examines the effect of DI benefits level on program participation or caseload size.  Participation in DI
27
is typically estimated as a function of the potential DI benefit—imputed for those not on the
program—and individual characteristics such as age and education, and locational characteristics.  The
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main parameter of interest, the elasticity of DI participation (or nonparticipation in the labor market) to
the DI benefit, varies widely in the literature. The results based on samples of older men (45–62)
provide elasticities ranging from 0.06–1.80. The largest elasticities in the literature are found by
Parsons and range from 0.63 (Parsons 1980a) to 1.80 (Parsons 1980b). Slade (1984) estimates an
elasticity of 0.81. The magnitude of these elasticities is sufficient to explain all of the observed decline
in labor force participation rates by older men in the 1970s. Haveman and Wolfe (1984b) claim that
Parsons' estimates are flawed and instead estimate an elasticity between 0.06 and 0.21 (Haveman and27
      The elasticities cited are from the econometric studies that utilized cross-sectional data. The time-
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series studies are summarized by Leonard (1986).
      Some of the studies (e.g., Parsons 1980a and 1980b) do include wages but only their pre-disability
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level, and only in the form of a replacement rate, which results in neither an income nor a wage
elasticity. There are many difficulties in estimating the work-incentive effects of the DI program which
are not encountered in the literature for the nondisabled. These include the endogeneity of DI
benefits—due to its relationship to previous work experiences, the uncertainty of DI receipt, and the
difficulty in imputing DI benefits for non-recipients. These issues and their relevance for the empirical
Wolfe 1984a; Haveman, de Jong, and Wolfe 1991). The other main estimates fall in the range of 0.10
to 0.20 (Halpern and Hausman 1986; Leonard 1979). Older workers, those in poor health and with
greater disabilities, and those with lower earnings have been found to be more responsive to changes in
benefits (Haveman and Wolfe 1984a; Slade 1984). Haveman, de Jong, and Wolfe (1988) find evidence
that women are more sensitive to benefits as they estimate elasticities of 0.97 for female heads of
household and 0.23 for married women.
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Variation in the leniency of determining eligibility has been used to examine the sensitivity of
DI participation to the uncertainty of benefits. Parsons (1991) and Gruber and Kubik (1994) use over
time and across state variation in DI denial rates to estimate how DI applications and nonparticipation
in the labor market are affected by the uncertainty of benefits. Parsons finds the elasticity of
applications to the denial rate to be -0.18. Gruber and Kubik find the elasticity of nonparticipation with
respect to the denial rate to be -0.27.
Although much of the empirical work in this literature is of great interest, the results fall
significantly short of what would be needed to estimate the effect of the TWP, the EPE, or other work-
incentive provisions. In the absence of direct evaluations of the TWP, for example, inferences about its
effects could be made only by estimating the number of individuals who would prefer to work above
SGA but still receive benefits, and wage elasticities as well as income elasticities are needed for this
prediction. The marked absence of attempts at estimated wage elasticities is, in fact, the major defect of
this literature for assessing the effectiveness of work-incentive provisions.  Furthermore, in these
3028
literature are discussed in Leonard 1986; Haveman and Wolfe 1994b; Bound 1991; and Hoynes and
Moffitt 1994.
studies, participation in DI is considered equivalent to nonparticipation in the labor market. This rules
out examining the sort of responses shown by the arrows in Figures 2 and 3.
As noted in our review of the empirical results for nondisability programs, the available
evidence should generate skepticism that there are any significant positive net effects on work
incentives from provisions designed to generate financial inducements for recipients to work while on
the rolls. While the TWP and EPE are quite different in form than is a simple MTR, the same types of
effects are involved and, therefore, the results from the nondisability programs should generate concern
about the effectiveness of the TWP and EPE. One issue that presumably would be very important in an
assessment of whether the nondisability results are applicable to DI programs is also whether the
responsiveness of the disabled to changes in benefits and tax rates (that is, their income and substitution
elasticities) are or are not similar to those of female heads and other low-income groups that commonly
receive nondisability benefits. Whether the responsiveness is higher or lower seems unclear from the
literature. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that there are many ways in which the populations
and programs differ which may contribute to different responsiveness levels. It is clear that DI
recipients face different obstacles to labor market success than those faced by female heads of
household. Disabled individuals may face difficulties in labor supply (due to physical or emotional
conditions impacting their ability to work) and labor demand (due to the availability of jobs for persons
with disabilities). Furthermore, contrasted with AFDC, receipt of DI benefits is uncertain and subject to
long waiting periods, due to difficulties in evaluating the medical definition of disability. Lastly, the
availability of public health insurance may be quite important for disabled workers, especially due to
pre-existing–condition clauses in private insurance.
3.4 Expected Effects of Reforms to DI Work Incentives29
      Specifically, the National Academy of Social Insurance (1994) outlines five possible reforms:
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indexing the SGA amount to keep pace with wage growth; raising the SGA level to the level for the
blind ($930 in 1993) and indexing to keep pace with wage growth; providing a partial offset (MTR) of
50 percent to be imposed after the TWP on earnings above the monthly SGA; providing a partial offset
(MTR) of 50 percent to be imposed after the TWP on earnings above $85 a month; and extending the
TWP by 12 months. By introducing the partial offset, the work-incentive effects of the DI program are
made more similar to those in place in the SSI program.
      Increasing the SGA would also expand eligibility for SSI. The impacts are likely to be larger for
32
the DI program since the SGA only affects initial (but not continuing) eligibility for the SSI program. 
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) reflects a desire to encourage labor
force participation among the disabled. As is often noted, the existence of the DI program does run
counter to this goal by encouraging reductions in work effort among the disabled. Compared to a
program with a strict SGA limitation, however, the TWP and EPE features of DI do produce work
incentives for current recipients, even though their overall impact is ambiguous in direction. Several
changes to the work incentives of the DI program are under consideration and include increasing the
SGA, extending the length of the TWP, and imposing an MTR of 50 percent on earnings after the end
of the TWP.
31
Increasing the SGA increases the DI caseload but has ambiguous impacts on work effort among
the disabled.  This change affects work effort, program exit, and program entry in two ways. First, this
32
change lowers the costs of application because higher work effort can be sustained without exceeding
SGA (required for initial application). Second, as shown in Figure 4, increasing the SGA shifts up the
























SGA  shifts out the DI budget constraint from ABCD to ABEF. This will lead to increases in hours of 1
work among some current recipients, as shown by arrow 1 in the figure. However, by allowing for
higher levels of work with full benefits, the more generous program lowers the exit rate from the rolls
for some recipients, who stay on the rolls and ultimately work less than they would have otherwise. In
addition, the change attracts new entrants who, if they apply and are successful in getting onto the rolls,
will take advantage of the SGA to work while on the rolls but at a lower level than they would have had
they been off the rolls, as illustrated by arrows 2 and 3. Some of these new entrants are eligible under
the expanded program, as illustrated by arrow 2, and others may take advantage of the increased
benefits and reduce their work effort to become eligible, as shown by arrow 3. This leads to increases
in the caseload both through increases in the entry rate as well as decreases in the exit rate.
Similarly, adding a partial benefit or MTR on earnings during the EPE will tend to increase
work levels among current DI recipients, but the impact on overall work effort among all disabled
persons is indeterminate in direction (the caseload will unambiguously rise). Figure 5 shows the budget
constraint for the EPE before and after the introduction of the partial offset where the MTR is imposed
only on earnings over the SGA. Under current law and with this expansion, the slope of the budget
constraint below the SGA (ABC) is w, reflecting an MTR of zero. With the expansion, above the SGA
there is an MTR of 50 percent which operates until benefits are reduced to zero. As before, arrow 1
shows the likely movement in work levels among current recipients. This increase in work effort is the
intended effect of the expansion. However, a positive income effect and negative substitution effect
suggest that work levels will fall for others, as shown by arrows 2 and 3, both from reduced exit and
increased entry. Under this expansion, the potential increase in the caseload is quite large. Using theHours of Work
Figure 5



















      This is calculated by setting benefits (B-0.5*(wh-500)) equal to zero and solving for the earnings
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level where benefits are just exhausted. 
Imposing a 50 percent MTR on earnings over an $85 exclusion during the EPE would result in
closer parity between the SSI and DI work incentives. This change, however, differs from those
considered in the text because benefits would be lower than they are under current law for some ranges
of earnings because the $85 exclusion is below the SGA level of $500. By increasing the tax rate (from
0 to 50 percent) we may see a reduction in work effort for current recipients. However, by eliminating
the notch (and its high MTR) and extending benefits past the SGA, we may see an increase in work
levels among some recipients. For this program change, the caseload as well as the net work effects are
ambiguous. The direction of the change in entry and exit rates is not predictable since for some hours
ranges the program has been expanded, while for others the program is less generous.
average 1993 benefit of $642, the break-even earnings level increases from SGA to about $1800 per
month or $22,000 per year.
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Increasing the length of the TWP also has ambiguous effects on work incentives. By allowing
recipients to work for more months before being taxed (for example, before entering the EPE), the
effective MTR in the program decreases. This can be expected to increase work levels—and the length
of time on the program for current participants. However, it can also be expected to reduce exit rates
and to attract new participants, both of whom will work at reduced levels during the additional 12
months than they would have otherwise. This will increase the size of the caseload as well.
The empirical literature, described above, provides little insight into the likely results of these
proposed reforms to DI work incentives. In general, the effect on overall work effort depends critically
on the relative sizes of the income and substitution effects for current recipients and potential entrants.
As we noted previously, existing research provides very little reliable information on these parameters.
The overall effect also depends on the size of the increase in break-even income and the density of the
eligible population in these areas of the earnings distribution—that is, the relative numbers of disabled
who can and prefer to work just above the SGA.34
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As the issue of increasing work incentives into the DI and SSI programs becomes of greater
policy interest, the lessons that have been learned from the experience with, and research on, similar
work-incentive provisions in programs for the nondisabled should be studied. Our review of the
nondisability program literature demonstrates that increasing work incentives through simple financial
inducements or changes in benefit formulas are unlikely to be as effective as they first appear. The
empirical research on such reforms in nondisability programs does not bode especially well for their
effectiveness, for the evidence is quite uniform in its failure to find strong responses to financial
inducements and decreased marginal tax rates. Lying behind this apparent ineffectiveness of financial
inducements is a set of possible explanations that involve new entry onto the programs as well as
decreased exit. While our review of the empirical research on DI and SSI does not allow us to reach
any conclusions about whether the magnitude of the responses that might be found in DI programs is
likely to be greater than that found in nondisability programs, the different types of responses that are
induced by financial inducements—both the intended increases in work effort and the unintended
reductions—should be present in DI and SSI, at least to some degree. This leads us to urge caution in
using financial inducements as a means of work-incentive reform in those programs without further,
concrete evidence of their effectiveness.
Policy toward work among AFDC recipients has evolved away from financial inducements in
recent years and has shifted toward the use of work, employment, and training programs to directly
encourage, and sometimes require, work. This policy shift began in the 1970s and occurred in part
because of the perceived failure of financial inducements, such as that provided by the amendments to
the 1967 Social Security Act, to increase AFDC recipient work levels and to reduce caseloads. In
addition, the shift reflected a society-wide change in attitudes toward work among women with
children, as it increasingly became the norm for such women to work rather than stay at home. A35
similar change in attitudes toward the disabled appears to have occurred, with many arguing that all
recipients should work to the degree they can. However, the use of financial inducements is still more
favorably viewed in policy discussions of SSI and DI than in the AFDC and other welfare programs,
which, as we have stressed, is not necessarily justified by the evidence.
A recent policy direction taken for AFDC and related programs is to provide financial
incentives to leave the welfare rolls by providing earnings and wage supplements for private sector
work. The most prominent of these programs is the earned income tax credit (EITC), which
supplements earnings of low-income families and which has been greatly increased in generosity. The
attractiveness of the EITC is that it has the potential to increase work and earnings and to reduce the
welfare caseload at the same time. The philosophy behind the EITC and similar private sector wage
subsidy programs is diametrically opposite to that behind the use of financial inducements to work
more while on welfare, for the latter has the potentially deleterious consequence of increasing the
caseload and possibly reducing work effort, which we have discussed at length in our paper. These
deleterious effects would not be present if financial inducements were offered only for off-welfare (or
both on- and off-welfare) work. It might be fruitful if policy discussions of disability programs turned
to such programs as well, perhaps by investigating special private sector earnings subsidy programs for
the disabled or modifications in the EITC to make more disabled individuals eligible for its benefits.
To determine the effectiveness of any of these policies in increasing work effort and reducing
caseloads in the DI and SSI programs, major research gaps need to be filled. Secondary analysis of
existing data sets using econometric techniques must be pursued with more of an eye toward estimating
wage and substitution elasticities, for example, although we recognize the difficulties in doing so.
Alternatively, either large- or small-scale microsimulation models could be constructed and the effects
of different work-incentive provisions could be predicted based upon a range of assumed
responsiveness levels and elasticities; this would provide at least some indication of how large or small36
responsiveness needs to be for work-incentive provisions to have a genuinely positive effect. Finally,
direct experiments or demonstrations on the caseload would be helpful in obtaining estimates of the
response to specific program initiatives, although it needs to be emphasized that program evaluations
need to be designed to capture both the exit and entry effects of financial inducements as well.37
References
Appel, Gary Louis. 1972. “Effects of a Financial Incentive on AFDC Employment: Michigan's
Experience between July 1969 and 1970.” Minneapolis: Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies.
Barr, Nicholas, and Robert Hall. 1981. “The Probability of Dependence on Public Assistance.”
Economica 48 (May): 109–24.
Bell, Winifred, and Dennis Bushe. 1975. Neglecting the Many, Helping the Few: The Impact of the
1967 AFDC Work Incentives. New York: Center for Studies in Income Maintenance Policy.
Blank, Rebecca. 1989. “The Effect of Medical Need and Medicaid on AFDC Participation.” Journal of
Human Resources 24 (Winter): 54–87.
Bound, John. 1989. “The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants.” American
Economic Review 79(3) (June): 482–503.
———. 1991. “The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: Reply.”
American Economic Review (December): 1427–34.
Burtless, Gary. 1986. “Social Security, Unanticipated Benefit Increases, and the Timing of
Retirement.” Review of Economic Studies 53 (Oct.): 781–805.
———. 1987. “The Work Response to a Guaranteed Income: A Survey of Experimental Evidence.” In
Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments, ed. Alicia Munnell. Boston: Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston and Brookings Institution.
Danziger, Sheldon, Robert Haveman, and Robert Plotnick. 1981. “How Income Transfers Affect Work,
Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature 19
(September): 975–1028.
Edin, Kathryn. 1991. “Surviving the Welfare System: How AFDC Recipients Make Ends Meet in
Chicago.” Social Problems 38 (November): 462–74.38
Fortin, Bernard, Michel Truchon, and Louis Beausejour. 1993. “On Reforming the Welfare System:
Workfare Meets the Negative Income Tax.” Journal of Public Economics 51: 119–51.
Fraker, Thomas, and Robert Moffitt. 1988. “The Effect of Food Stamps on Labor Supply: A Bivariate
Selection Model.” Journal of Public Economics 35 (February): 25–56.
Giannarelli, Linda, and Eugene Steuerle. 1994. “It's Not What You Make, It's What You Keep: Tax
Rates Faced by AFDC Recipients.” Paper presented at the Meetings of the Association for
Public Policy and Management, Chicago. October.
Gruber, John, and Jeffrey Kubik. 1994. “Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor Supply of
Older Workers.” Mimeo. August.
Halpern, Janice, and Jerry Hausman. 1986. “Choice under Uncertainty: A Model of Applications for
the SSDI Program.” Journal of Public Economics 31: 131–61.
Haveman, Robert, and Barbara Wolfe. 1984a. “Disability Transfers and Early Retirement: A Causal
Relationship?” Journal of Public Economics 24: 47–66.
———. 1984b. “The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation: Comment.” Journal of Political
Economy 92(3): 532–41.
Haveman, Robert, Philip de Jong, and Barbara Wolfe. 1988. “Labor and Transfer Incomes and Older
Women's Work.” NBER Working Paper no. 2728. October. 
———. 1991. “Disability Transfers and the Work Decision of Older Men.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics (August): 939–49.
Haveman, Robert, Barbara Wolfe, and Jennifer Warlick. 1988. “Labor Market Behavior of Older Men:
Estimates from a Trichotomous Choice Model.” Journal of Public Economics 36: 153–75.
Heckman, James. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” Econometrica 47(1)
(January): 153–61.39
Hoynes, Hilary. 1993. “Welfare Transfers in Two-Parent Families: Labor Supply and Welfare
Participation under AFDC-UP.” NBER Working Paper no. 4407.
Hoynes, Hilary, and Robert Moffitt. 1994. “Incentives to Work in the Disability Income Program.”
Mimeo. December.
Keane, Michael, and Robert Moffitt. 1991. “A Structural Model of Multiple Welfare Program
Participation.” Mimeo.
Kehrer, Kenneth, and Robert Moffitt. 1981. “The Effect of Tax and Transfer Programs on Labor
Supply: The Evidence from the Income Maintenance Experiments.” In Research in Labor
Economics, vol. 4, ed. Ronald Ehrenberg. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
Leonard, Jonathan. 1979. “The Social Security Disability Program and Labor Force Participation.”
NBER Working Paper no. 392. August.
———. 1986. “Labor Supply Incentives and Disincentives for Disabled Persons.” In Disability and the
Labor Market, ed. Monroe Berkowitz and M. Anne Hill, pp. 64–94. Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press.
Levy, Frank. 1979. “The Labor Supply of Female Heads, or AFDC Work Incentives Don't Work Too
Well.” Journal of Human Resources 14 (Winter): 76–97.
Marvel, Howard. 1982 . “An Economic Analysis of the Operation of SSDI.” Journal of Human
Resources: 393–412.
Masters, Stanley H., and Irwin Garfinkel. 1977. Estimating the Labor Supply Effects of Income
Maintenance Alternatives. New York: Academic Press.
McGarry, Kathleen. 1993. “Factors Determining Participation of the Elderly in SSI.” Mimeo.
Moffitt, Robert. 1983. “An Economic Model of Welfare Stigma.” American Economic Review 73
(December): 1023–35.
———. 1986. “Work Incentives in the AFDC System: An Analysis of the 1981 Reforms.” American
Economic Review 76 (May): 219–23.40
———. 1992. “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review.” Journal of Economic
Literature 30 (March): 1–61.
Moffitt, Robert, and Barbara Wolfe. 1990. The Effects of Medicaid on Welfare Dependency and Work.
Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty, Special Report no. 49. 
———. 1992. “The Effect of the Medicaid Program on Welfare Participation and Labor Supply.”
Review of Economics and Statistics 74 (November): 615–26.
Muller, Scott. 1992. “Disability Beneficiaries Who Work and Their Experience under Program Work
Incentives.” Social Security Bulletin (Summer).
National Academy of Social Insurance. 1994. Preliminary Status Report of the Disability Policy Panel. 
March.
Parsons, Donald. 1980a. “The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation.” Journal of Political
Economy 88(1): 117–34.
———. 1980b. “Racial Trends in Male Labor Force Participation.” American Economic Review 70:
911–20.
———. 1984. “Disability Insurance and Male Labor Force Participation: A Response to Haveman and
Wolfe.” Journal of Political Economy 92(3): 542–49.
———. 1991. “Self-Screening Targeted Public Transfer Programs.” Journal of Political Economy 99:
859–76.
——— . 1991. “The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: Comment.”
American Economic Review (December): 1419–26.
Research Triangle Institute. 1981. “Final Report: Evaluation of the 1981 AFDC Amendments.”
Research Triangle Park, N.C.
Slade, Frederic. 1984. “Older Men: Disability Insurance and the Incentive to Work.” Industrial
Relations (Spring): 260–69.41
Smith, Vernon. 1974. “Welfare Work Incentives: The Earnings Exemption and Its Impact upon AFDC
Employment, Earnings, and Program Cost.” Lansing: Michigan Department of Social Services.
Social Security Administration. 1992. Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement.
———. 1993. “Quarterly Report on SSI Disabled Workers and Work-Incentive Provisions.” June. 
———. 1994. Social Security Bulletin (Summer).
SRI International. 1983. Final Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiment: Design
and Results, vol. 1. Menlo Park, Calif.: SRI International.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. 1984. Background Material and Data
on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office. Various issues. 
———. 1994. Green Book. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Winkler, Anne. 1991. “The Incentive Effects of Medicaid on Women's Labor Supply.” Journal of
Human Resources 26 (Spring): 308–37.
Yelowitz, Aaron. 1994. “The Medicaid Notch, Labor Supply and Welfare Participation: Evidence from
Eligibility Expansions.” Mimeograph.